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The paper discusses implications for practice and theory of the recently completed Joint 
Evaluation of General Budget Support 2004-06 based on case studies in Burkina Faso, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam. 
The paper first looks at the extent to which general budget support, on the evidence of the 
evaluation, stands up to common criticisms of the effects of aid on government in low income, 
aid dependent countries. Allowing for much caution owing to the short period of partnership 
general budget support (PGBS) programmes in some countries, the finding is that there are 
small but positive impacts (notably reducing unnecessary transaction costs and increasing 
discretion of government—thereby raising allocative and operational efficiency). Net benefits 
are generally greater where PGBS programmes are longer established.  
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Areas of uncertainty regarding future effects are its uncertain overall contribution to the private 
sector and growth, its vulnerability to changes in political relations, and the limitations to raising 
‘pro-poor expenditure’—the main tool it has used to leverage increases in health and education 
spending; long term improvements in access and quality of public services will rely on better 
planning, budgeting and services management. 
The paper then considers how the evaluation results affect the way that PGBS is understood in 
theory: (i) it first suggests that PGBS raises entitlements (by increasing confidence that there 
will be continuing flows of budget support) which encourages policy development and stable 
donor-government collaboration structures, to which other shorter term aid arrangements 
gravitate, thereby reducing previous coordination failures; (ii) relations in organizations are then 
identified on a spectrum from market through club to hierarchy. Applied to PGBS coordination 
structures this suggests they are aspirant clubs, with hierarchical features strongest where PGBS 
is least established, and club features stronger where government is more capable and assertive; 
(iii) entitlements are accompanied by rules which attempt to raise positive incentive effects of 
the entitlement and reduce its negative incentive effects. In PGBS arrangements rules vary from 
hierarchical (e.g., prior actions), through club oriented (e.g., assessment on medium term trends) 
to market oriented (performance payments related to achievement on specific indicators). The 
analysis of rules in relation to PGBS incentives and operating environments (on a spectrum 
from rigid/uncertain to flexible/predictable) concludes that fine tuning rules in rigid/uncertain 
operating environments is counterproductive. Integrating PGBS performance assessment 
frameworks (PAFs) into government plans and monitoring systems will serve to unify rules. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper discusses implications for practice and theory of the recently completed Joint 
Evaluation of General Budget Support 2004-06 based on case studies in Burkina Faso, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam,1 and the separate 
evaluation study in Tanzania (Lawson et al. 2005). The evaluation was commissioned 
by a consortium of DAC-based donors. The evaluation was preceded by the design of 
an evaluation framework, which was further developed during the evaluation studies. 
The evaluation framework is in the form of a logical framework with feedback effects. 
It sought to find out the effects which the partnership general budget support (PGBS) 
(via its inputs of finance, policy dialogue, conditionality, technical assistance, 
harmonization and alignment) has had on collaborating governments, and particularly 
the services they deliver to the poor. The short duration of PGBS programmes to date, 
even in Uganda where they have been established since the mid-1990s, reduced the 
extent to which effects on services to the poor could be attributed to PGBS, though 
PGBS is argued to have contributed to the expansion of education and health services 
(e.g., in Tanzania).  
Budget support as a form of aid takes a variety of forms. In the transition from colony to 
independence, it was used by the colonial power to close the budgetary gap in newly 
independent states (e.g., Uganda, Botswana) on a short-medium term basis. It has been 
used on a short-term basis by individual donors and international financial institutions 
(IFIs) to help states carry out major, politically difficult reforms after economic crises 
(e.g., Japanese assistance to southeast Asian states after the Asian financial crisis of 
1996-97). It is used on a short-term basis to assist governments to provide humanitarian 
assistance after natural disasters (e.g., Pakistan after the Himalayan earthquakes). It is 
also used on a longer-term bilateral basis to support politically favoured regimes under 
military threat (e.g., US support to Israel and Egypt). 
Partnership general budget support (PGBS) is longer-term budget support with active 
policy dialogue and supporting capacity-building activities, designed to support 
recipient government policy for poverty reduction. It emerged from the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the late 1990s which sought to establish the 
common purpose of donors and government to reduce poverty, in return for debt relief. 
The partnership approach of HIPC was in part a reaction to the confrontational 
experience with budget support for structural adjustment purposes in the 1980s and 
1990s, particularly in low-income, aid dependent states. PGBS is used as a tool for 
assisting committed political leadership to strengthen state functions and performance 
and get flexible resources to pursue desired policies: by providing a more reliable 
stream of funding through government and both demanding and enabling higher 
standards of performance from government systems; by rationalizing and simplifying 
donor demands on weak governments in line with the government’s own objectives. To 
achieve these objectives, it sets up long term communication and negotiation structures, 
and agreements regarding timetables of disbursements, performance levels and joint 
funding by donors.  
                                                 
1   The study was carried out by a consortium led by IDD, University of Birmingham. Synthesis and 
country reports from the evaluation are at www.idd.bham.ac.uk/general-budget-support/ and at 
www.oecd.org/site/0,2865,en_21571361_34047972_1_1_1_1_1,00 .   2
The evaluation was based on analysing the content and effects of PGBS programmes in 
the case countries. This had to proceed by identifying PGBS programmes on a 
programme-by-programme basis since different donors and different countries use their 
own labels and categorize similar flows differently. This problem prevented the 
evaluation from carrying out in parallel an intended econometric study of the effects of 
budget support over a longer period.2 
The paper first looks at the extent to which PGBS, on the evidence of the evaluation, 
stands up to common criticisms of the effects of aid on government in low-income, aid 
dependent countries (section 2). A number of queries are then raised (section 3). In 
section 4 the paper turns to its second main task of looking at what the findings of the 
evaluation contribute to understanding of the nature of PGBS. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Charges against aid—how well does PGBS stand up to them? 
A summary of the charges regarding the negative effects which aid can have on the 
recipient state would include: 
—  policy statements and policy realities may be driven further apart;  
—  donors may dictate an inappropriate policy agenda; 
—  domestic accountability may remain poor even though accountability to 
donors improves; 
—  government resource management systems may be sidelined by putting 
resources through alternative channels (e.g., project management units outside 
government); 
—  cost and waste in public services may increase; 
—  domestic public revenue collection may be reduced; 
—  opportunities for fraud may be increased; 
—  unnecessary management costs may be imposed on government by having to 
deal with multiple donors individually; 
—  aid raises resource availability risks to government through unpredictability of 
funding and donor short-termism; 
—  aid raises debt dependency, by expanding public expenditure commitments 
based on loans; and 
—  aid biases against vigorous private sector growth by expanding an unreformed 
public sector; 
                                                 
2   The main international database on aid flows (OECD-DAC) was found to lack clear definition of aid 
modalities and suffers from inadequate coverage of aid flows and unreliable categorisation. Reliable 
multi-country quantitative analysis of programme aid flows and effects was found not to be possible 
with existing data. This emphasises the need for aid categories to be internationally standardised and 
aid flows captured in an international database much more comprehensively than at present.   3
PGBS (partnership/poverty reduction general budget support) is supposed to avoid the 
negative effects of other aid modalities, and to create benefits of wider and more secure 
collaboration between donors and governments, and among donors. Above all it is 
supposed to raise the capability of the state.  
We consider each of the main areas to which the charges above apply, but with a 
caution: the main differences observed were between countries, with great variation in 
the way PGBS is designed and managed. Also in each country, PGBS as mode of aid is 
evolving. Therefore it is dangerous to generalize specific effects of PGBS.  
Other cautions: many effects noted are not of PGBS alone but of parallel initiatives by 
government and donors (e.g., via DAC on harmonization and alignment). PGBS is 
presently the standard bearer aid mode for a wider movement of change, of which sector 
programmes and projects with governments are increasingly part, where they are 
increasingly on-treasury and on-budget.  
Charge 1: Donors dictate policy; policy statements and realities may be driven 
further apart; domestic policy processes are weakened by donors 
A hypothesis underlying PGBS is that more flexible resources enable more coherent 
policy. The country studies found evidence to support the following observations with 
respect to the effects of PGBS:  
−  The prospect of predictable funds to finance policies provided an incentive for 
policy review and development (e.g., flexible and predictable funding for the 
budget in Rwanda encouraged governments to take risks in policymaking, 
being confident of the funding availability, e.g., implementation of public 
sector reform, and capitation grant for full fee-free basic education); in Uganda 
two of the policy moves that have had dramatic positive effects—universal 
primary education and the abolition of health care charges—were introduced 
unilaterally by the government of Uganda despite initial donor scepticism. The 
Tanzania evaluation found that GBS has enabled shifts in budget allocations, 
which indicated that the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) with its stress on 
social services was not a good reflection of political priorities (Lawson et al. 
2005: para 146). 
−  Making funds available through the regular planning and budgetary systems of 
government helped strengthen processes, gave sector agencies more incentive 
to compete for such funds, and increased coherence across public agencies 
(e.g., financing a broader and more articulated set of sector policies in Burkina 
Faso’s revised PRSP, 2004); 
−  More coherent donor inputs to policy: this is a general effect of donor 
collaboration and coordination, plus more specific effects at sector level, e.g., 
in Mozambique the PGBS working groups exposed sectors’ progress to 
comparison and mutual learning, and increased pressure for change in sectors 
by making them part of the overall Performance Assessment Framework 
rating);   4
−  Increased transparency and participation: participation in policy processes is 
not strong in the case countries. However better connecting of line ministries 
with central ones, particularly through medium-term budgeting, is an advance 
in many cases (e.g., in Burkina Faso, and in Rwanda despite the difficulties 
with developing the MTEF); 
−  Technical assistance (TA) more focused on policy (e.g., in Vietnam, PGBS 
with complementary TA projects help strengthen policy design and 
implementation). 
In sum, although there is plenty of evidence of donors trying to set policy agendas (e.g., 
the criticisms of PRSPs and the Washington consensus—both of which inform donor 
thinking in PGBS), the evaluation found a correlation between overall PGBS effect in 
providing greater policy space and policymaking capacity to governments and the 
degree of PGBS penetration (duration, and relative importance, and sophistication of 
dialogue arrangements). Thus, ironically, deeper involvement of donors in partnership 
arrangements with governments and other donors (joint funding arrangements, agreed 
performance assessment frameworks), characterized as ‘government ownership with 
donor influence’, is positively correlated with providing discretionary funding for 
government via PGBS.  
Charge 2: Domestic accountability remains poor even though accountability to 
donors improves 
A hypothesis motivating PGBS is that accountability to donors shifts from concern with 
how their specific packages of resources are spent (as in projects) to focus on how well 
government manages resources through its planning, budgeting and financial controls. 
Such better resource management by government is more transparent and worthy of 
challenge by parliament and society. Hence domestic accountability should increase as a 
result of PGBS. 
The country studies found that: 
−  A strong effect of PGBS is in focusing donors on the quality of government 
systems. It has led to more (and more joint) analysis of PFM issues, and is 
beginning to lead to more coordinated and coherent TA (see Charge 3 below); 
−  Stronger links between policy and strategic expenditure planning are needed to 
achieve accountability for results. Medium-term expenditure/budgetary 
frameworks (MTEFs) are the tool for achieving this. But creating MTEFs is 
not easy: it is not just a technical reform; it requires strong leadership on the 
government side to enforce expenditure limits and performance targets, and 
good management of public services. Uganda’s headstart in medium-term 
budgeting is the reason for its better scores across the range of PFM 
performance indicators than other case countries (credibility of the budget, 
comprehensiveness and transparency, policy based budgeting, predictability 
and control in budget execution, accounting and reporting). 
−  Weaknesses in the budgetary process are also inhibitions on democratic 
accountability (e.g., as found in Mozambique: the fact that a large part of   5
public expenditure is off-budget means it is not subject to either parliamentary 
scrutiny or external audit).  
In sum, in none of the case countries is domestic accountability strong. Democratic 
accountability emerges from political processes as much as from better governance 
(e.g., relatively strong parliamentary accountability in Rwanda, and political 
accountability in Vietnam within the ruling party). Though the effect is not (yet?) 
strong, PGBS is arguably serving as a stimulus to debates over accountability (e.g., civil 
society feeling cut out of donor-government processes e.g., in Tanzania), providing 
better information on which accountability can be based, and helping to construct 
medium-term budgeting. 
Charge 3: Aid causes government resource management systems to be sidelined 
by putting resources through alternative channels (e.g., project 
management units outside government) 
Another hypothesis motivating PGBS is that putting resources through government 
systems and demanding higher standards from them will improve their quality. PGBS 
should therefore help to counter negative effects on government capacity of other aid 
which bypasses government. The finding is that wherever PGBS has become 
established, there are some positive effects on government’s expenditure management 
systems, though these are only beginnings from a still low base3; and there is greater 
alignment of aid with government planning and budget cycles. Non-PGBS modalities 
have also benefited from funds flowing directly into the budget as a whole, allowing a 
better balance between recurrent and capital expenditures; this also makes it easier for 
governments to provide the counterpart funds required by some donors’ projects.  
PGBS is by definition disbursed through, and therefore aligned with, government 
financial management and procurement systems; this accounts for many of the effects 
found. Much aid remains off-treasury and off-budget in most case countries—including 
aid provided by some of the same donors who participate in PGBS in the same country. 
Since performance in procurement was weak in most case countries, though improving, 
weakness of government system appears not to be the reason for slowness in getting on-
budget; entrenched practices in sector programmes and projects, and the habit of sector 
ministries receiving direct payments from donors rather than from the budget, may 
rather be the reason. There is therefore the prospect of more aid coming on-budget as 
practices change and central government exerts more budgetary authority.  
However, greater reliance by donors on government TA management, statistics and 
analytic work is neither automatic nor immediately in prospect. Government leadership 
in aid coordination is usually limited, and even where it is stronger (e.g., Uganda, 
Rwanda, Nicaragua, Tanzania) does not yet include leadership in TA management. 
Collaboration in the analytic work on which donors rely (e.g., expenditure and impact 
reviews) is rare—let alone reliance on government's own analytic work. The evaluation 
found some increase in reliance on government auditing and reporting, but little if any 
                                                 
3   The evaluation estimated levels and trends of change for a variety of PFM indicators used by PEFA 
and HIPC in the categories: PFM out turns; credibility of the budget; key crosscutting issues: 
comprehensiveness and transparency; budget cycle; donor practices. While most levels were reported 
as weak or moderate, most trends were constant or rising.    6
use of government analytic work. Difficulties in creating capacity, particularly in small 
countries, may be the cause: either high costs of setting up adequate services of this sort 
within government, or political obstacles to opening up public service employment 
sufficiently to skilled external candidates (which is a possible reason for the absence of 
government leadership in TA management), or to contracted services, or to developing 
such services on a regional basis. The Bretton Woods institutes lead the provision of 
analytic work, particularly in PFM. 
Charge 4: Aid can increase cost and waste in public services, by putting  
money too rapidly into poorly managed services without reform 
A hypothesis of the PRS approaches is that increased funding of essential social 
services reduces poverty. The charge is that aid can increase cost and waste in public 
services, by putting money too rapidly into poorly managed services without reform. 
The country studies found that state expenditure on social sectors—health and education 
particularly—expanded as a proportion of GDP in response to HIPC and PGBS.4 But 
expansion has been in quantity rather than quality of services, extending access to often 
low-grade services.  
The tool for leveraging PGBS payments into increases in social expenditure has been 
‘pro-poor expenditures’ (PPEs). The HIPC initiative in the late 1990s prompted the 
focus on PPEs, with the aim of ensuring that the poor benefit from debt relief. PRSPs 
have further raised the profile of the concept. The finding was that defining pro-poor 
expenditures has been useful in reorienting budgets towards underfunded programmes 
(e.g., Uganda), or for tracking key expenditures and enhancing their predictability while 
budget systems are strengthened (Malawi, Mozambique). But raising the proportion of 
PPEs is not a tool that can easily be used more than once. Regarding quality, broad 
definitions of PPEs may insufficiently prioritize expenditures within sectors, while 
narrow definitions may be inadequate in a comprehensive strategy for poverty 
reduction. Thus in the long run, PPEs may distract from the need for decisionmaking 
processes which deliver efficient expenditure allocations for the budget as a whole, and 
strong, comprehensive PFM systems.  
In sum, PPEs are a blunt instrument and no substitute for strengthening the link between 
planning and medium-term budgeting. PPEs are not an efficient means to ensure that 
substantial increases in PGBS further reduce social poverty. This suggests the 
absorptive capacity for increased aid is limited to the pace at which services quality and 
the public finance systems funding the services can be improved; that in turn raises 
reform issues, including non-state provision of public services.  
                                                 
4   In Nicaragua and Malawi where the experience of PGBS is very brief, HIPC Initiative is the sole 
cause of the rise in health and education spending.   7
Charge 5: Aid disrupts the public finance accountability relation between 
taxpayers and government, and reduces public revenue collection 
Regarding revenue collection, revenue reforms in the case countries (particularly the 
move to set up independent revenue authorities) predated or accompanied HIPC and 
PGBS, supported by projects and TA. There was no fall in the revenue/GDP ratio in the 
case countries during the PGBS period and in some cases it rose. Further increases in 
PGBS could be linked to maintaining revenue/GDP, or even increasing it to a target 
level that would enable budget support to be phased out by a desired date, provided that 
desired GDP growth is maintained (Foster and Keith 2003).  
Accountability problems tend to be less with revenue levels than revenue processes, 
owing to underperforming domestic institutions: e.g., inadequate parliamentary 
scrutiny; predatory revenue collection by local governments; failure to prosecute 
revenue fraud owing to a weak criminal justice system. Arguably GBS is a vital means 
for raising accountability by creating policy space through flexible funding for 
committed governments to improve such institutional functioning, and by raising 
capacity in PFM, as indicated above (Charge 2). 
Charge 6: Increased aid through government systems may increase opportunities 
for corruption 
The assumption often is that programme aid, being less directly controlled by donors, is 
more open to fraud than is project aid. Although corruption in relation to PGBS was not 
a focus of the evaluation, no evidence was found that GBS is more prone to fraud than 
other aid instruments. The increased focus accompanying PGBS on improved fiduciary 
management of public funds may make it less so, though the improvements are slow 
and from very low levels. Much fraud is associated with construction contracts, and 
programme aid is less oriented to the capital budget than is project aid. Furthermore, aid 
agencies themselves as they move away from tied aid and towards budget support are 
less likely to attract charges of collusion in non-transparent contracts and in tax 
avoidance on imports. 
Charge 7: Unnecessary costs are imposed on government by having to deal 
with multiple donors who impose conflicting demands, with uncertain 
disbursement of committed aid 
An assumption motivating PGBS is the expectation that donor collaboration with 
government and with each other to support government budgets will reduce costs of 
dealing with multiple donors (harmonization and alignment) and increase predictability 
of disbursement.  
Country studies found that PGBS savings on costs stem from the built-in harmonization 
that it brings through donors working together. The difficulties of measuring transaction 
costs meant that the studies were not able to assess whether PGBS had resulted in 
overall changes. It was clear that PGBS transaction costs are substantial at the setup 
stage (costs of concentrated PGBS negotiation are significant); and may be lower than 
at the implementation stage, though this is less clear. Further, many of the increased 
costs accompanying PGBS—many of which arise from coordination and review   8
meetings—may have long-term external benefits for greater coherence. An important 
observation is that the net effect of PGBS programmes on overall transaction costs must 
be to raise them as long as other forms of aid continue in parallel on a large scale.  
A concern has been the emergence of performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) as 
separate donor oriented mechanisms of accountability, proliferating multiple 
performance indicators. There is no doubt that these raise transaction costs both for 
donors and government and reduce ownership. The evaluation, extending the 
recommendations of the Paris Declaration, notes the opportunity and importance of: 
−  integrating PAFs into new generations of government operational strategies;  
−  linking PAFs more systematically to strategies for developing national 
monitoring and evaluation capacity, and 
−  linking central and sector dialogue and monitoring. 
Regarding predictability of aid disbursements, each of the study countries had 
experience of programme aid suspensions, and even in the case of mature PGBS 
relationships (Uganda, Mozambique) there are concerns in government about the extent 
to which disbursements by donors can be relied upon.5 However, PGBS has the 
advantage of providing a collective forum in which such problems have been addressed, 
even if not fully resolved. Positive changes include: timetables for PGBS reviews and 
deadlines for disbursements dictated by government’s budget cycle, rankings of donor 
performance in budget support (SPA 2005), mutual accountability reviews 
(Mozambique), and revision by IMF of its on-track/off-track signalling to reduce risks 
of donor overreaction.  
The main risk remains broadly political: PGBS disbursements are particularly 
vulnerable to suspensions to register political protest, since they are direct transfers to 
government to carry out its everyday business, rather than emergency humanitarian aid, 
or projects in which commercial contractual commitments have been signed. Proposed 
ways of reducing the political vulnerability of PGBS include associating it more clearly 
with its budgetary uses—such notional ring-fencing might serve to protect it a little 
better, particularly where budget support is assigned to local governments for essential 
services, since local governments usually are not the cause of international political 
stand-offs. 
Charge 8: Aid doesn’t effectively reduce unsustainable debt of poor countries 
The charge is of continuing moral hazard and adverse selection in the aid industry; that 
HIPC despite its innovations6 has not ended the ‘debt-go-round’ in which donors 
                                                 
5   Predictability of direct budget support was estimated as weak in Malawi and Uganda and only 
moderate in Nicaragua and Vietnam, though improving in Uganda and Vietnam. And ‘predictability 
in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures’—a government rather than donor 
responsibility—was also mostly weak, though good in Vietnam and moderately in Burkina Faso and 
Uganda (IDD and Associates 2006: annex D).  
6   HIPCs’ innovations in debt relief included greater size, focus on creating debt sustainability for the 
most debt-ridden poor countries, coverage of debt stock as well as debt servicing, insistence that   9
pretend to enforce conditions and recipients pretend to fulfil them; multilaterals 
continue to make risky loans to governments which cannot realistically service them, 
confident that bilaterals will provide debt relief if needed; IMF still plays the 
contradictory role of gatekeeper and creditor, under pressure to reopen the gate virtually 
immediately after closing it. In this way the development banks and IMF provide a 
safety net for insolvent governments, at the expense of incentives to governments and 
themselves to manage resources well. Those making the charge (IOB 2003; Easterly 
2001) cite decades of repeated debt relief which have not reduced indebtedness.  
PGBS, emerging from the HIPC, consisting of loans as well as grants, is easily 
classified as part of this alleged global welfare arrangement for insolvent governments 
cum business generation for development banks and IMF.  
The crunch questions for PGBS are whether it is countering or reinforcing this alleged 
incentive to poor management of resources and debt, and whether it is encouraging 
economic growth better to enable the economy to use and service loans. On the first of 
these questions, the evaluation finds that PGBS is contributing positively to recipients’ 
PFM systems, though progress is necessarily slow and uneven among countries. IFIs are 
also participating increasingly in PGBS structures for donor-government collaboration, 
including joint funding arrangements and performance assessment frameworks 
(Lawson, Gerster and Hoole 2005), which makes rogue behaviour by donors less likely. 
PRSPs are also beginning to be altered by governments towards their own plans (e.g., 
Vietnam, Mozambique). To the second question there is not such a confident defence, 
as is discussed below.  
Charge 9: Aid does not encourage the private sector sufficiently 
The theory of GBS gives priority to governance institutions, with better functioning 
governance institutions leading to greater investor confidence and growth (as in 
endogenous growth theory). The charge is that aid is now neglecting investments in 
infrastructure and reforms to promote private business. In doing so, it risks expanding 
an unreformed public sector, which competes for scarce skilled resources and capital. 
This is a charge levelled particularly against HIPC and against the content of current 
PGBS programmes, because of their orientation towards raising social sector spending. 
PGBS can claim some credit for higher growth rates where instability in donor 
government relations had restricted investment; however this effect is difficult to isolate 
since flows of budget support tend to accompany political change, particularly where 
this involves ending of civil hostilities, or regime change towards more open politics 
and trade. In these circumstances, there is a bounce-back effect in investment and 
business activity, to which aid contributes. All of the PGBS evaluation case studies 
were in such countries, except Burkina Faso.  
Large aid inflows can raise real exchange rates, discouraging exports and foreign 
investment and encouraging imports, in Dutch disease style. Given that in the case study 
countries PGBS has generally substituted for other aid rather than increased aid levels 
                                                                                                                                               
World Bank, IMF and regional development banks should pay a portion of the debt relief themselves, 
plus commitment of recipients to PRSPs.   10
overall, this is a charge which does not immediately stick. However, the intention is to 
raise PGBS and overall aid levels (as in Monterrey commitments) in order to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); therefore the vulnerability of exchange 
rates to increases in aid is a pertinent concern. In Uganda and Tanzania, both with 
mature PGBS relations with donors, sterilization costs in the form of higher interest 
charges, have been substantial in recent years. These result from open market purchases 
by the treasury in order to stabilize nominal exchange rates and reduce inflationary 
tendencies. The cause of the problem is not aid alone, since there are other inflows of 
foreign exchange (e.g., investment, remittances, exports proceeds) but aid is a major 
factor. Collaboration with IMF on this problem has resulted (e.g., in Tanzania) in 
reduced sterilization of inflows, letting inflation rates creep up. The problem is partly 
one of small low-income economies with their own currencies, and small, shallow 
financial markets, which reemphasizes the potential benefits to be gained from greater 
regional integration in both trade and factor markets. There is a strong case for 
investigating the extension of PGBS to regional priorities in infrastructure, trade 
promotion, employment and financial market development. 
Summing up 
The evaluation of PGBS has thrown light particularly on operational arrangements and 
how well they work. Earlier research, e.g., Foster and Keith 2003, argues that GBS as a 
low-transaction cost means of increasing aid flows could enable states with 
demonstrated ability to generate economic growth and maintain political stability, to 
move more rapidly in reducing poverty, but without examining operational 
arrangements in any detail.  
Allowing for cautions regarding its short period of operation and variation among 
countries, what the evaluation has demonstrated is that PGBS: 
−  can increase allocative efficiency in public spending, by providing flexible 
funds and enabling public priorities to be financed;7 
−  provides a focus on PFM which is enabling/encouraging other forms of aid to 
be brought on budget and/or on treasury; 
−  provides a forum of sufficient critical mass to: (i) enable flows of finance and 
rules of different donors to be consolidated; (ii) become increasingly 
influential in donor-government relations, involving most bilateral and 
multilateral donors and (in the most advanced cases) strong involvement of 
government; (iii) be able to evolve operational arrangements for PGBS, e.g., 
reducing its unpredictability through timetabling disbursements and clarifying 
conditions in joint funding agreements and performance assessment 
frameworks; and (iv) be stable and long term in its outlook. 
The evaluation found that PGBS can, at worst, plead neutrality (i.e., does no harm) to 
the charges above and at best (notably costs imposed by donors and discretion to 
                                                 
7   Defining allocative efficiency as publicly desired allocation of public resources/actual allocation, and 
operational efficiency as outputs of priority public services/inputs   11
government) some positive impact. The exception is its doubtful benefit to the private 
sector and growth. 
3 Queries  arising 
Queries were raised with regard to: 
−  pro-poor expenditures: efficiency and future viability. Do net benefits from 
PGBS hit a ceiling which it is difficult to break through? Raising pro-poor 
expenditures leveraged a step increase in social spending under HIPC and 
PGBS. But this may not easily be repeated. There is no quick fix alternative to 
enabling central, sector and local systems of government to work better 
together in budgeting, service provision, cash management, monitoring and 
planning. This is an obstacle facing all aid modes and is therefore not an 
argument against PGBS. 
−  marked expansions in aid to small countries risk Dutch disease effects unless 
markets in foreign exchange, goods, services and factors, are deepened and 
widened; increased regional integration in trade, employment and financial 
markets could reduce Dutch disease effects; 
−  tendency of PAFs to be separate from government strategy documents and to 
multiply indicators and conditions instead of streamline;  
−  revenue/GDP: is it high enough to keep social poverty at the desired level and 
achieve non-aid dependence within a politically acceptable timeframe? Or is it 
already too high to sustain needed growth?  
−  private sector development and economic growth: are they sufficiently 
encouraged by PGBS and by other components of the wider relationship 
between poor and rich countries, particularly trade? and 
−  government systems that are not used by PGBS: analytic work, aid 
coordination, and TA management. Tying PAFs increasingly into government 
plans, and government data and monitoring systems is an important step. 
A wider question which arises is: Does PGBS take any predictable path?  
The only common element in entry conditions to PGBS was found to be political trust, 
which may or may not deepen. The operational arrangements for PGBS differ in terms 
of multilateral/bilateral leadership, donor-government working groups, degree of 
harmonization, approaches to disbursement and conditionality. However, much of these 
differences may be because PGBS is a new way of working. There is some evidence of 
learning from what appeared to be more advanced collaborative arrangements 
(Mozambique, Uganda, Vietnam, Tanzania), in which case greater convergence in 
PGBS operational arrangements might be observed in future. The flow of funds does 
tend to increase over time (compare Malawi and Nicaragua—where PGBS was just 
beginning—with Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Uganda, with programmes several 
years old). And, most importantly, the benefits from PGBS were found to be greater and   12
the operational arrangements better developed in the countries where PGBS was longer 
established.  
But the case studies do not provide evidence for confidently projecting these findings as 
a ‘happy trend’ in which there is increasingly productive collaboration until the 
recipient government is sufficiently able, and the country sufficiently wealthy, that 
PGBS is no longer required. First, political trust remains fragile at any stage of   
the PGBS relationship (e.g., in Malawi and Nicaragua it was fragile at the beginning 
of PGBS; in Uganda it became fragile after many years of PGBS). Second, there is no 
certainty that improvements in government capacity or economic growth can be 
continuously maintained by PGBS: the case studies found that even PFM systems, on 
which PGBS efforts are most heavily concentrated, though improved, are still very 
weak, while the effects of PGBS on economic growth are not clear. Third, the influence 
of PGBS is limited: it is only one influence among many on governments, with 
domestic and regional political considerations being far more important; and PGBS 
funds remain a minor flow of foreign exchange, even within aid flows. 
In sum, while PGBS in different countries might tread an increasingly similar path in 
terms of operational arrangements (i.e., working groups, performance agreements, joint 
funding agreements, timetables, etc.), its future effects and continuity cannot easily be 
predicted, let alone taken for granted. 
4  Understanding PGBS effects: entitlements, rules, hierarchy, club and market 
This section discusses the implications of the study findings for how we understand the 
nature of PGBS and behaviour of actors within PGBS.  
A major finding of the evaluation is that PGBS has effects on longer-term behaviour 
and relationships with government and other modes of aid, notably: 
−  the evidence of increased policy development by governments; 
−  the greater stability, longer term working arrangements and leadership it tends 
to establish in donor-government relations; and 
−  the gravitational influence it has on other aid to government (sector 
programmes, projects), attracting them into PGBS forums, and encouraging 
their aid to be paid into treasury and to be reflected in the budget. 
4.1 Entitlement 
What type of innovation then is PGBS, that it has such benefits? It contains a strong 
element of entitlement.8 Entitlements arise from current economic activity (trade, own 
production, employment), from past economic activity (savings) and from social 
relations (inheritance, rights to receive transfers) (Sen 1981: 2). It is this last source of 
entitlement—the right to receive transfers—which describes PGBS in the context of aid. 
                                                 
8   ‘Entitlement refers to the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society 
using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces’ (Sen 1984: 497).   13
PGBS is not a guaranteed, fixed transfer but establishes a joint understanding that, 
subject to performance, transfers will be made. 
The right to receive transfers confers some degree of confidence that there will be a 
future stream of income in addition to the income currently received from that source. 
Entitlements to a future income are particularly valued as hedges against risk, in the 
manner that a ‘put option’ raises the asset value of a security held.9  
In this way PGBS, through current non-earmarked transfers into treasury and through 
creating the confidence that they will be repeated in future, potentially makes for 
increased policy discretion for government both immediately and in the future: it 
encourages policies to be pursued that previously may not have been funded (e.g., by 
projects), and also encourages policy development. These effects will not necessarily 
take place: that depends on priorities and the will of government leaders. But PGBS 
makes it easier to do so. 
4.2 Coordination 
The longer-term commitment encourages creation of structures to manage the 
relationship, which become a fixed point towards which passing relationships (e.g., 
short/medium term projects) or more specific relationships (e.g., sector programmes) 
tend to gravitate: because that is where the longer-term thinking is being done, and 
where the link to higher levels of government are stronger. Hence the evaluation found 
that PGBS forums increase in size as PGBS becomes more established, even tending to 
become unmanageably large (e.g., in Mozambique). 
This is evidence of PGBS reducing coordination failure. Coordination failure lowers 
allocative efficiency, and typically stems from synchronization problems (poor timing), 
information problems (main actors having different information) and assignment 
problems (poor teamwork) (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 90-2). The move to promote 
harmonization and alignment is designed to reduce coordination failures. PGBS, 
through both  its inbuilt alignment (disbursing via government systems) and the 
gravitational pull of its structures on aid arrangements with lower mass (donors are keen 
to be part of more influential structures), reduces coordination failure. 
4.3 Incentives 
Entitlements which reduce future risk are recognized as having a greater effect on 
longer-term behaviour than what current income alone has, in the manner that 
‘permanent income’ determines consumption spending. Positive effects are the stimulus 
to policy development and coordination, indicated above. 
The right to receive future transfers also has potentially negative effects on behaviour—
recognized in the monopoly model as inefficiencies, and in moral hazard as increased 
risk displacement onto the insurer once the contract is in place. Single transfers are 
                                                 
9   ‘An option contract that gives the holder the right to sell a certain quantity of an underlying security to 
the writer of the option, at a specified price (strike price) up to a specified date (expiration date)’.  
Source of definition: Investwords   14
much more likely to be free gifts (i.e., no strings attached) than are repeated transfers, 
because of the latter’s greater cost and the stronger incentive effects of commitments to 
future transfers.  
Therefore entitlements to future transfers tend to come packaged with rules which 
govern them. However, rules differ (e.g., in content and means of enforcement) 
according to the operating environment, the nature of the entitlement, and nature of the 
organization through which the entitlement is provided. Before exploring differences in 
rules and their effects as they apply to PGBS, we need first therefore to set out the range 
of features of organizations. 
4.4  Hierarchy, club and market 
It is suggested, as set out in Figure 1, that there are three types of relation in 
organizations, in different mixes:10  
−  market relations are those in buying and selling, focused on the transaction, in 
which the rules are those governing commerce; 
−   club relations are those in collaborating for a primarily non-commercial 
purpose, in which rules are decided by club members to govern their behaviour 
towards each other and towards non-members;  
−  hierarchy relations are for control, in which the rules are decided by leaders of 
the hierarchy.11 
One or other relation tends to be dominant in any one structure, and is usually the 
relation appropriate to the main purpose for which the structure exists, and by which it 
then tends to be labelled overall. Thus a structure labelled business firm contains 
relations of hierarchy and club within it, but the market relation predominates in its 
behaviour. A bureaucracy contains market and club relations, but its primary function is 
decisionmaking in a hierarchical manner. A voluntary organization contains elements of 
hierarchy and market but club elements predominate.  
Predominance of one relation also characterizes relations between organizations. They 
are predominantly market or hierarchy when confined to the activity which is their 
raison d’être (e.g., selling/buying books, enforcing/paying taxes). But when the activity 
is a common interest (e.g., setting/maintaining safety standards in an industry, 
improving waste disposal in a locality) relations are predominantly club.12  
                                                 
10  Building onto Williamson’s concepts of markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1974) and inspired by 
Hirschman’s (1970) analysis of dissent behaviour in organizations (exit, voice, loyalty). 
11    Different relations are appropriate to different operations of an organization: human resource 
management theory, learning from Japanese experience, stresses the importance of club relations 
among staff within the organization, while finance management stresses hierarchy, and strategic 
management stresses market.  
12 So-called ‘hybrid organizations’ are usually common interest collaborations among separate 
organizations and relations within them are therefore predominantly club in nature. Menard (2004) 
discusses the variety of ‘hybrid organizations’, differing in their degree of formality according to the 
purpose they serve.   15
Figure 1  
Types and characteristics of relations in organizations  








       
Objective  Mutual benefit from 
exchange 
Common interest and 
purpose 
Task to be accomplished 
       
Focus  Transactions  Collaboration  Control 
       
Rules  Commercial rules 
enforcing contracts 
Club rules relating to 
entry, conduct, 
entitlements, exit 
Decided by leaders 
       
Entitlements  Exchange value in the 
transaction  
As set out in club rules  At discretion of leadership 
       
Incentives  Gain from the 
exchange 
Joint achievement  Reward for success and 
punishment for failure 
       
How uncertainty & 
risk are dealt with 
Hedging, insurance  Participation, trust, 
transparency, information 
sharing 
Feedback of specific 
indicators to decision 
makers 
       
Dissent behaviour  Exit, sometimes 
preceded by voice 
Voice and loyalty, with 
exit as last resort 
Loyalty, then exit with 
voice 
Source: Author. 
Organizational structures are dynamic, and the relational element which is dominant 
may change as the purpose of the organization and/or its means of survival, changes; for 
example, charities which effectively or formally become firms, and vice versa.  
Figure 1 sets out a range of organizational relations (market, club and hierarchy), then 
differentiates each according to its more detailed characteristics, identified here as 
objective, focus, rules, entitlements, incentives, approach to risk and uncertainty, and 
dissent behaviour.  
In terms of the relations set out in Figure 1, how can PGBS be described? 
Lawson et al. (2003: 79) suggest that PGBS partnerships are a club in which 
uncertainties regarding the government’s development agenda that is being supported 
require donors to have voice (influence) in return for which they accept limitations on 
exit. Loyalty in the relationship can be increased by better understanding each others’ 
motivations, constraints and risks. 
The observations of the PGBS evaluation and of the PAF study (Lawson, Gerster and 
Hoole 2005) enable further light to be thrown on relations within PGBS arrangements: 
−  In donor-government relations PGBS aspires to be a club (joint commitment to 
PRS. etc.) but is in weak states still often more of a hierarchy pretending to be   16
a club.13 Hierarchy is dominant owing to PRSPs not yet being fully owned, 
limited participation and ‘voice’ by government in constructing rules, lower 
levels of trust, and quick resort to punishment (usually suspension of 
disbursement)14 by donors;  
−  PGBS operations have set up parallel structures to government (hierarchy with 
vertical integration) in the form of PAFs and annual progress reviews (APRs) 
which are separate from government’s PRS and monitoring and evaluation 
systems—understandable where government systems are weak, but ironic 
since a major purpose of PGBS is to avoid parallel structures which sideline 
government systems; and a priority for integration into government plans and 
systems, as the evaluation recommends. 
−  Only where recipient governments have more capacity and commitment are 
club relations clearly evident in donor-government PGBS dealings. Uganda 
and Vietnam are examples: both have strong ‘voice’ and participation, both 
constructed their own PRS, insist on their own policy priorities and challenge 
donors (including Vietnam going ‘off-track’ with IMF but its PGBS 
continuing); and 
−  Among donors, club relations vary in strength. While there is strong desire to 
take part in PGBS meetings as important sources of information, participation 
(‘voice’ plus collaboration) is often confined to a smaller subgroup. It is 
sometimes regarded as a matter of chance whether or not there is effective 
leadership of the donor group. More generally, effective participation by 
government seems to be the crucial factor determining wider and deeper 
participation by donors. 
Donors have different assumptions about how the PGBS relation with government 
should be conducted: some see more of a market orientation as appropriate, i.e., a 
transaction-focused approach in which there is an exchange of funds against actions and 
results delivered on particular indicators; others want more of a club approach, 
emphasizing attention to process, information richness, and trends as the basis for 
judging progress. The latter requires a harmonized and aligned approach (i.e., working 
together, using government systems as far as possible); the former, in principle, does not 
require harmonization among donors and relies entirely on government actions and 
systems—since payments are made on the basis of transparent performance indicator 
achievements (notably the principle underlying the Millennium Challenge Account of 
the US government, and that of the European Commission in budget support).  
To discuss this issue further we turn to look at rules more closely.  
                                                 
13  A PGBS arrangement which is predominantly ‘club’ in nature might also deliberately masquerade as 
‘hierarchy’ for external appearance; e.g., with regard to prior actions that are already a fait accompli 
but used for signalling to external stakeholders (e.g., World Bank board) that they are exerting 
influence. Thanks to Stephen Lister for pointing this out. 
14 Suspension of disbursement is less than ‘exit’ (termination of relations) since the underlying aid 
agreement between country and donor usually remains in place   17
4.5 Rules 
Rules fulfil different purposes according to the nature of the organization through which 
the entitlement is provided: in a hierarchy, rules help retain control; in a club they are a 
means for rebalancing the incentives changed by alterations in entitlement, seeking to 
raise incentives for positive effects and reduce negative incentives. Whatever the 
organizational character, rules must be appropriate to the particular operating 
environment and should be reviewed and changed as circumstances change. 
In sum, rules differ (e.g., in content and means of enforcement) according to the 
operating environment (risk and uncertainty, flexibility), the nature of the entitlement, 
and the nature of the organization through which the entitlement is provided. 
Figure 2 sets out the types of rules currently present in PGBS arrangements.  
The evaluation confirmed the expectation from contract theory that, owing to pervasive 
risk and uncertainty, PGBS—and PAFs in particular—currently resembles a ‘relational 
contract’ in design and operation. A relational contract ‘specifies only the general terms 
and objectives of a relationship and specifies mechanisms for decision-making and 
dispute resolution’ (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Relational contracts are widely used 
when the contracted task is complex and/or the environment in which it is taking place 
has much risk and uncertainty (e.g., major engineering works). A relational contract 
partially/temporarily suspends market relations between principal and agent in order to 
allow them to work together in a club-like manner, i.e., collaborative problem-solving 
for a common purpose. It is also an important means of building trust through teamwork 
 
Figure 2 
Types of PGBS rules according to types of organizational relations 
Types of relations   







      
General rules  Commercial rules enforc-
ing contracts 
Club rules relating to 
entry, conduct, 
entitlements, exit 
Decided by leaders 
      
Rules for basic payment  Macroeconomic stability 
on-track 
Trend performance  Prior actions 
      
Rules for results oriented 
payments 
Performance related 
tranches, based on 
indicators 
  
      
Monitoring information: 
- What is monitored? 
- What data? 
- Who monitors? 
Specific agreed indicators, 
using agreed data and 
objective monitor. 
Ideally govt’s own 
indicators and data for 
plan and budget, 
monitored by govt’s own 
team, supported and 





Source: Author.   18
in the face of uncertainty. A relational contract amounts to a commercial framework 
with broad parameters (time, cost, quality) within which club relations predominate as 
long as the overall parameters do not look like being upset. If they do, there is a switch 
to more commercial (market) behaviour to alter the task or put in place more 
appropriate parameters. In the case of PAFs the parameters are necessarily very broad 
and there is no formal commercial contract at its heart. 
The resemblance of PGBS behaviour to behaviour in relational contracts—the mix of 
market and club behaviour, and the switching between the two as confidence in the 
relationship fluctuates—may clarify why rules within PGBS arrangements vary: among 
donors there are varying levels of confidence in the relationship and there is much 
uncertainty about response to incentives. Integrating PAFs into government plans, 
budgets, data and monitoring systems—strongly recommended by the evaluation and 
Paris Declaration—will help to unify rules. 
 
Figure 3 
Appropriate rules for assistance depend on the operating environment 
 
Source:   Author. 
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income state 
e.g., PGBS   19
Figure 3 illustrates the main point made above. It suggests that a change in 
organizational arrangements and resulting entitlement (e.g., introduction of PGBS) in 
turn changes incentives and rules. The appropriate rules depend on the operating 
environment, which is characterized as either flexible and predictable (necessary inputs 
are readily available, prices are stable, transaction costs are low, key actors are free to 
make necessary changes) or rigid and uncertain (the opposite), or in between these 
extremes. The more flexible and predictable the operating environment, the more 
beneficially can market oriented rules be used, since the incentive they provide can be 
responded to; and the more rigid and uncertain the operating environment the more 
appropriate are club rules, since performance incentives can less easily be responded to 
genuinely and may encourage fraud, and become a diversion from priorities. 
Hence the recommendations of the evaluation regarding performance assessment 
frameworks:  
—  Take care that disbursement-linked conditions are kept to a minimum and 
are genuinely agreed with government. 
—  Ensure that performance assessment systems address all links in the results 
chain, so as to serve the management and monitoring of the implementation 
of strategies, as well as the monitoring of results. 
—  Decisions to increase or reduce levels of PGBS support should mainly be 
based on medium-term assessments of overall performance 
(From Recommendation 7, IDD and Associates 2006: 6.54) 
And the Paris Declaration states in this regard: 
—  Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ 
results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks. 
—  Harmonize their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can 
rely more extensively on partner countries’ statistical, monitoring and 
evaluation systems, [work] with partner countries to the maximum extent 
possible on joint formats for periodic reporting. 
(OECD-DAC 2005) 
5 Conclusion 
There is an overall summary of the paper at the beginning. Therefore this conclusion is 
confined to discussing issues arising from the analysis.  
First, theory suggests that club relations should be predominant in PGBS arrangements, 
since they are based on apparent common interest and the goals they set cannot easily 
be achieved by predominantly market or hierarchical relations between donor and 
recipient. There is evidence that more successful cases of PGBS have stronger club 
features. Where government capacity is low and government is heavily dependent on 
donors, PGBS relations are more hierarchic.   20
Second, a major issue in PGBS relations is that credible long-term commitments affect 
incentives more than single unrepeated payments, by creating a degree of entitlement. 
Positive effects were found to be investment in policy review, policymaking capacity 
and public finance management. Potential negative effects of PGBS entitlement on 
incentives may be to divert government attention from domestic revenue and domestic 
accountability. The evaluation did not find evidence of these negative effects. 
Third, the rules of engagement in PGBS agreements (timetables, performance 
indicators) reflect the underlying club nature of PGBS. The effectiveness of club 
relations depends heavily on credible commitments by the main parties. This is 
especially so in PGBS relations, given their wide scope (the whole of government 
policy to reduce poverty and improve governance) and the uncertainties facing each 
party. Asset specificity does not create the risk in PGBS arrangements, since there are 
no investments which rely on PGBS arrangements continuing.15 Rather, the problem is 
extensive uncertainties for all main parties, including how to control incentive effects 
resulting from PGBS.  
Uncertainties underlie the preoccupation of PGBS partnership arrangements with 
designing performance assessment frameworks. They also underlie the problem of too 
many performance indicators, and the search for ways to make PGBS less vulnerable to 
changes in donor priorities and political standoffs. Attempts to shift PGBS rules towards 
a market basis (a small number of agreed outcome indicators which trigger/deny 
disbursements, without partnership working—as in MCA intentions) have had to be 
scaled back to fixed plus variable tranches, and pre-qualification finance in the case of 
MCA, disbursed through PGBS partnership working or through projects in the case of 
MCA funds via USAID. 
General budget support using market-type rules based on outcome indicators, with 
arms-length relations, remains a prospect. As capacity of recipient governments rise—
particularly in the quality of budgeting and monitoring—there may be shifts towards 
more marked-type rules. But an alternative is that PGBS donors particularly may shift 
from general to sector budget support as government capacity rises, in order to retain 
involvement in policy dialogue relevant to poverty reduction or growth. Current DFID 








                                                 
15 Asset specificity creates particular risks related to the investment, whereas uncertainty in PGBS 
relations stems from many different sources for different parties, and therefore takes many forms.   21
Acronyms 
APR   annual progress review of PRSP  
BWI   Bretton Woods institutions 
HIPC   highly indebted poor countries  
IFI   international financial institution 
MTEF   medium-term expenditure framework 
MCA   Millennium Challenge Account 
PAF   performance assessment framework 
PGBS   partnership general budget support (also known as poverty reduction general 
support)   
PPE   pro-poor expenditure 
PRS   poverty reduction strategy 
PRSP   poverty reduction strategy paper 
TA technical  assistance 
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